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Jarratt: The Reasonable-Woman Standard

COMMENT
CUSTOMIZING THE REASONABLEWOMAN STANDARD TO FIT
EMOTIONALLY AND
FINANCIALLY DISABLED
PLAINTIFFS IS OUTSIDE THE
SCOPE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT'S PROHIBITION ON SEXBASED DISCRIMINATION:

HOLLY D. V. CALIFORNIA
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
INTRODUCTION

Workplace sexual harassment is a developing area of federallaw. 1 As federal courts define the contours of sexual har1 Changes to the standard of employer liability for supervisor harassment in
1998 have made it necessary for lower federal courts to reconsider many aspects of
federal sexual harassment law. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807
(1998) (held that employers are strictly vicariously liable for supervisor harassment,
however, employer may invoke an affirmative reasonable-care defense if the plaintiff
has not suffered a tangible employment action). See also Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding on
liability lower federal courts have had to decide whether coerced submission and constructive discharge are tangible employment actions. Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310
F.3d 84,94 (2nd Cir. 2002) (holding that coerced submission is a tangible employment
action); Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
coerced submission is a tangible employment action); but see Fisher v. Elec. Data Sys.,
278 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (submission to a quid pro quo threat is not
tangible employment action harassment); see Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 461 (3rd.
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assment, it is important that these courts shape the law in a
way that furthers the purposes behind Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. 2 Recently, the Ninth Circuit decided a novel issue
in sexual harassment law. 3 In Holly D. v. California Institute
of Technology, the plaintiff alleged that she engaged in sexual
relations with her supervisor in order to retain her position
with the California Institute of Technology.4 The Ninth Circuit
held that employers are strictly vicariously liable when a supervisor threatens job-related consequences, such as termination or demotion, to coerce a subordinate into sexual relations. 5
The threat can be implicit or explicit. 6 To find an implicit
threat in the Ninth Circuit, courts look for a nexus between the
supervisor's sexual advances and the supervisor's exercise of
authority over the employee alleging that she was harassed. 7
When the threat is implicit, the plaintiff must show that a reasonable woman in her position would have believed that her
continued employment depended upon submitting to her supervisor sexually.8 In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit suggested
that it might consider an employee's emotional and financial
disabilities in a case in which the employee alleges that her
supervisor used implicit threats to coerce her into a sexual re-

Cir. 2003} (constructive discharge is a tangible employment action). For a more extensive discussion of the development of federal anti-sexual harassment law, see infra
notes 21-143 and accompanying text.
2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. A § 2000e-I-17 (West 2004);
see Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-6 (1998) (the policies behind Title
VII are reflected in the Court's creation of the reasonable-care defense. The Court's
attention to these policies when shaping the law indicates that while sexual harassment law is not directly addressed by Title VII, the development of federal antiharassment law under this Act should remain consistent with the purposes behind the
Civil Rights Act).
3 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2003).
4 [d. at 1161-62.
5 [d. at 1162.
6 [d. at 1173.
7 E.g. Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1994).
8 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2003). Currently, the Ninth Circuit uses a reasonable-woman standard in sexual harassment
cases when the plaintiff is female and a reasonable man standard when the plaintiff is
a male. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,879 & n.11 (9th Cir. 1991). But see Nichols v.
Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 1994) (listing other traits that the Ninth Circuit
might incorporate into the reasonable woman standard, such as "race, age, physical or
mental disability, and sexual orientation"); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522,
1527 (9th Cir. 1995) ("hostile work environment" must be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics)."
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lationship.9 Holly D., however, did not argue that her emotional and financial disabilities should have been considered by
the court.lO Consequently, the Ninth Circuit applied the reasonable-woman standard, merely noting that these disabilities
might have a legal effect if raised in a later case. l1 This Comment suggests that the Ninth Circuit should not customize the
reasonable-woman standard to include a plaintiffs emotional
and financial disabilities.
Tailoring the reasonable-woman standard to include select
disabilities is problematic because employer liability would improperly depend upon the effect that the victim's disability had
on the victim's perception, instead of on the agency relationship
between the supervisor and the employer. 12 Furthermore,
these subjective standards would prevent employers from successfully invoking the reasonable care defenseY Using these
tailored standards would also result in discriminatory treatment under the law for women who did not qualify for one of
these customized standardsY Finally, customized standards
9 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Holly
D. did not ... argue that a different standard of "reasonableness" should be applied to
her than to the average woman who held the type of job she held. Finally, she did not
present argument or evidence as to what any different standard should be in the case
of women in financial or psychological difficulty. Under these circumstances, we do not
address the issue of whether the supervisor's conduct as alleged here could constitute a
tangible employment action in the case of a woman who alleges that her responses
must be viewed not from the standpoint of an average reasonable-woman but from that
of a reasonable woman suffering from serious financial and emotional disabilities. We
reserve that issue for an appropriate case)." [d. This Comment focuses solely on sexual harassment by a supervisory employee against a subordinate as sexual harassment
by a supervisor carries strict liability for the plaintiff's employer under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) ("employer
is vicariously liable for actionable [sexual harassment] caused by a supervisor"); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (employer is vicariously liable
for hostile work environment sexual harassment caused by a supervisor).
10 Holly D. V. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003).
11 [d. The reasonable-woman standard is a legal construct created to evaluate an
alleged harasser's conduct. See Ellison V. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879-81 (9th Cir. 1991).
A female plaintiff must demonstrate to the factfinder that a reasonable woman would
have found the defendant's misconduct severe enough to alter the victim's working
conditions. [d at 879. This standard is used in hostile work environment sexual harassment cases and in tangible employment action cases involving an implicit threat.
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (hostile work environment claim
standard is reasonable-woman); Holly D. V. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th
Cir. 2003) (the existence of an implicit quid pro quo in a tangible employment action
claim threat is determined through a reasonable-woman standard).
12 See infra notes 153-165 and accompanying text.
13 See infra note 166-168 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
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would sterilize American workplaces. 15 In support of this
Comment's assertions against factoring the emotional and financial difficulties of the actual plaintiff into the reasonablewoman standard, Part I provides a background of federal sexual harassment law, ending with a review of the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology.16 Part II (a) discusses how customized standards would
enlarge the scope of employer liability, conflicting with the
principles of agency law that justify holding employers strictly
vicariously liable for supervisor harassment and decreasing
employers' abilities to use the reasonable care defense. 17 Part
II (b) suggests that customized reasonable-woman standards
create unequal treatment for women under the law, a contravention of anti-discrimination laws. 1s Part II (c) proposes that
customized standards would strike a death blow to workplace
romances because supervisors and employers would fear that
innocent relationships might lead to sanctions. 19 Part III concludes that customized reasonable-woman standards cause a
number of problems that can be best avoided by leaving these
standards buried in a Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology footnote. 2o
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

SEXUAL HARAsSMENT VIOLATES TITLE VII's PROHIBITION
ON SEX DISCRIMINATION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (hereinafter, Title VII)
prohibits employers from making employment decisions because of the sex of the employee (or applicant) or from discriminating against an employee in the "compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment" because of that employee's sex. 21 Conservative legislators added sex as a last
minute attempt to kill the Civil Rights Act. 22 Those legislators'
See infra notes 184-201 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 21-143 and accompanying text.
17 See supra notes 12 and 13.
18 See supra note 14.
19 See supra note 15.
20 See infra notes 201-204 and accompanying text.
21 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000-e-2 (a)(1) (West 2004).
22 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,63 (1986).
15

16

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss1/6

4

Jarratt: The Reasonable-Woman Standard

2004]

THE REASONABLE-WOMAN STANDARD

131

plans backfired, and the bill passed as amended. 23 Since sex
was a last minute addition, there is little legislative history to
indicate Congress's intentions in banning sexual discrimination. 24 As a result, gender discrimination under Title VII has
developed through case law and agency guidelines. 25
In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(hereinafter, "EEOC"), chartered by Congress to enforce the
Civil Rights Act, recognized sexual harassment as a violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 26 The EEOC issues administrative guidelines entitled, "Guidelines on Discrimination Because Of Sex" that provide the public with the EEOC's stance
on statutory compliance. 27 These guidelines cover a spectrum
of sexual harassment issues, from defining harassment that
violates Title VII to advising employers on how to eliminate
sexual harassment through preventive measures. 28 According
to the EEOC guidelines, sexual harassment violates Title VII
when the harasser explicitly or implicitly conditions the victim's continued employment on the victim's willingness to
submit to unwanted sexual advances, requests for sexual relations, or other verbal or physical acts of a sexual nature. 29
Courts commonly refer to this type of harassment as quid pro
quo harassment. 3o Title VII also prohibits harassing conduct
Id.at 64.
Id.
25 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the federal agency responsible for enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4(g) (West
2004); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986).
26 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is a 5 member board empowered to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4(a) (West
2004); 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(a) (West 2004). See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
65 (1986) (acknowledging that the EEOC determined that sexual harassment was a
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1980); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2004)
(originally issued in 1980).
27 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2004).
28 29 C.F.R. § 1604. l1(a)-(g) (2004).
29 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a)(1)-(2) (2004).
30 For examples of this terminology, see Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 65 (1986); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1998);
Gorski v. N.H. Dep't ofCorr., 290 F.3d 466, 472 (1st Cir. 2002); Leibovitz v. New York
City Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 188 (2nd Cir. 2001); Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432,
441 (3rd. Cir. 2003); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 186 (4th Cir. 2001);
Ackel v. Nat'l Communications., Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 381-82 (5th Cir. 2003); Akers v.
Alvey, 338 F.3d 491,500 (6th Cir. 2003); Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317,324-25
(7th Cir. 2003); Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 721, 735 (8th Cir. 2000);
Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1221 (10th Cir. 2002); Pipkins v. City of Temple
Terrace, 267 F.3d 1197, 1200 (11th Cir. 2001); Peyton v. DiMario, 287 F.3d 1121, 1124
23

24
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that has the effect of unreasonably interfering with the victim's
work environment. 31 Courts commonly refer to this type of
harassment as "hostile work environment sexual harassment."32
Sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII first came before the U.S. Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 33 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson held that "hostile work
environment sexual harassment" was a form of sex discrimination that violated Title VII. 34 Furthermore, an employer is not
automatically liable for a supervisor's harassing behavior.35
Instead, federal courts should look to the principles of agency
law to determine when an employer is liable for its supervisor's
misconduct. 36 For twelve years, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the lower federal courts to determine employer liability
(D.C. Cir. 2002). But see Holly D. v. Cal. !nst. of Tech., 359 F.3d 1158, 1167 n.13 (9th
Cir. 2003) (in light of Supreme Court's changes in the liability standard the Ninth
Circuit now distinguishes between "tangible employment action sexual harassment"
and "hostile environment sexual harassment"). Id. "Quid pro quo" is Latin for "something for something." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1261 (7th ed. 1999).
31 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a)(3) (2004).
32 For examples of this terminology, see Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57,65 (1986); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-753 (1998);
Gorski v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 472 (1st Cir. 2002); Leibovitz v. New York
City Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 188 (2nd Cir. 2001); Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432,
441 (3rd. Cir. 2003); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 186 (4th Cir. 2001);
Ackel v. Nat'l Communications., Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 381-82 (5th Cir. 2003); Akers v.
Alvey, 338 F.3d 491,500 (6th Cir. 2003); Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 324325 (7th Cir. 2003); Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 721, 735 (8th Cir. 2000);
Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1221 (10th Cir. 2002); Pipkins v. City of Temple
Terrace, 267 F.3d 1197, 1200 (11th Cir. 2001); Peyton v. DiMario, 287 F.3d 1121, 1124
(D.C. Cir. 2002). Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 359 F.3d 1158, 1167 n. 13 (9th Cir.
2003). "Hostile work environment," "hostile work environment harassment," and "hostile work environment sexual harassment" will be used interchangeably throughout
this Comment.
33 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59 (1986).
34 Id.at 64-66. Meritor did not directly decided whether quid pro quo harassment
violated Title VII; however, the court's adoption of the EEOC's guidelines strongly
indicates that the Court agreed that both quid pro quo and hostile work environment
harassment violated Title VII. See id.at 65-67. The court supported its holding with
two arguments. Id. First, the court found that the inclusion of the words "terms, conditions or privileges of employment [in the 42 U.S.C. 2000e] evince [d] a congressional
intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
employment." Id. at 64 (internal quotations omitted). Second, the court adopted the
EEOC conclusions, based upon racial harassment case law, that a hostile work environment which affected an employee's ability to perform her job or that was abusive,
offensive, or intimidating violated Title VII by changing the terms and conditions of the
affected individual's employment. Id. at 65-66.
35 Id. at 72-73.
36 Id. at 73.
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for sexual harassment committed by a supervisor.37 During
this time, "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment" sexual harassment carried different types of liability.3s Employer
liability for "quid pro quo harassment" carried vicarious liability, and liability for "hostile work environment sexual harassment" varied. 39

B.

EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY A
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEE: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
HOLDS EMPLOYERS STRICTLY VICARIOUSLY LIABLE

Twelve years after the U.S. Supreme Court announced its
decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court again
considered the issue of employer liability when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate. 4o Burlington Industries, Inc.
v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, companion cases
handed down on the same day, held that an employer is strictly
liable when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate.41
The Court, however, created an affirmative reasonable-care
defense available to employers when the supervisor's harassment does not result in a "tangible employment action," such as
firing, demoting, or failing to promote. 42

37 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775, 780 (1998); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,746-47 (1998).
38 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,788-91 (1998) (discussing the
different standards used by district courts for "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment" sexual harassment); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-53
(1998) (discussing the fact that lower federal courts used a vicarious liability standard
for "quid pro quo sexual harassment."
39 See supra note 38.
40 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 746-47 (1998).
41 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
42 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). A tangible employment action is an employment decision that significantly alters the terms or conditions of an employee's job.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Examples given by the
Court include hiring, firing, and failing to promote an employee. [d.
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The affirmative reasonable-care defense consists of two
prongs. 43 First, the employer must demonstrate that it made
efforts to prevent and correct sexual harassment. 44 Second, the
employer must show that the plaintiff-employee failed to act
reasonably to avoid harm by using the employer's complaint
procedures or through other means. 45 If the employer meets
the two prong test, then the employer is not liable for actionable sexual harassment. 46
C.

STRICT LIABILITY UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY LAw

Title VII imposes liability on the employer, not on the harasser.47 When a supervisor is the culprit, the employer is
strictly liable for the injury caused by the supervisor.48 In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, the U.S. Supreme Court turned to the Restatement of
Agency Law, section 219 to determine employer liability for
supervisor sexual harassment of a subordinate.49 An employer
is liable for the tort of its employee committed while acting
43 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). "The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable-care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
44 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,765 (1998).
45 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,765 (1998).
46 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
47 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003).
48 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,765 (1998).
49 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793, 797,801-2 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,755-58 (1998). Restatement § 219(1) "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the
scope of their employment; (2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his
servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: (d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relationship." [d. at 758 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency Law § 219 (1958».
The Restatement of Agency Law is "[01 ne of several influential treatises, published by
the American Law Institute, describing the law in a given area and guiding its development." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1314-1315 (7th ed. 1999). Restatements are not
binding authority. Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss1/6

8

Jarratt: The Reasonable-Woman Standard

2004]

THE REASONABLE-WOMAN STANDARD

135

within the scope of employment. 50 Conversely, an employer is
not liable if the employee's tort is outside the scope of employment, unless the agency relationship aids the employee in the
commission of the tort. 51 Since sexual harassment is outside
the scope of a supervisor's duties, the Court premised employer
liability for supervisor harassment on the fact that the agency
relationship empowers a supervisor with the employer's authority to make job-affecting decisions. 52 Even if the supervisor
does not directly threaten, for example, to fire or demote an
employee, subordinates are constantly aware of the supervisor's power to make these types of decisions. 53 This authority
increases the likelihood that an employee will endure a supervisor's sexually harassing behavior. 54 Although an employee
might feel comfortable rebuking the advances of a co-worker
without fear of retribution, the same may not be true when the
harasser is the employee's supervisor. 55 Thus, an argument
exists that the agency relationship always aids a supervisor to
harass subordinates. 56
While the agency relationship could potentially justify
strict vicarious liability for every instance of supervisor harassment, the Court previously rejected automatic employer liability in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 57 To resolve a potential conflict between Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries v.
50 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 801 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755-56 (1998). Restatement (Second) of Agency Law §
219(2)(d) (1958). A tort is "[a) civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained, usu
[ally) in the form of damages; a breach of a duty that the law imposes on everyone in
the same relation to one another as those involved in a given transaction." BLACK'S
LAw DrCTIONARY 1496 (7th ed. 1999).
51 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 801 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758 (1998).
52 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799-802 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 757,759-60 (1998).
63 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998).
54 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998); see Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998) (quoting Meritor Say. Bank. v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 77 (1986).
55 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998); see Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998).
66 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998).
57 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 & n.4 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998); Meritor Say. Bank. v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57,73 (1986).
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Ellerth, the Court created a reasonable-care defense that is
available to employers when the harassment does not result in
a tangible employment action. 58 A "tangible employment action" is a job-affecting decision that requires use of the power
invested in the supervisor by the employer, "such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits."59 Tangible employment actions justify
automatic liability because deciding to fire or demote an employee who rejects a supervisor sexually is a decision that the
supervisor was able to make because of the agency relationship.GO On the other hand, when a supervisor harasses other
employees by telling dirty jokes or making sexually derogatory
comments, the importance of the supervisor's position within
the company is less apparent. G1 Thus, employers have an opportunity to avoid automatic liability for otherwise actionable
harassment by showing that they acted reasonably to prevent
and correct sexual harassment and that the victim-employees
acted unreasonably by failing to avoid harm. G2
D.

THE REASONABLE-CARE DEFENSE REFLECTS IMPORTANT
PRINCIPLES BEHIND TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

Moreover, the reasonable-care defense reflects important
policies behind Title VII, such as preventing discrimination
and avoiding unnecessary injury.G3 Employers have an affirmative duty to prevent workplace harassment, and employees
have a duty to avoid unnecessary harm. 64 When no tangible
employment action occurs, the employer can escape liability for
58 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 & nA (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
59 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
60 [d. at 762-63.
61 [d. at 763.
62 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
63 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-806 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). ("Title VII borrows from tort law the
avoidable consequences doctrine") The avoidable consequences doctrine states that the
injured party should not recover for more injuries than those injuries that she could not
avoid through her own due diligence. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC 458 U.S. 219, 232 n.15
(1982).
64 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998)
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otherwise actionable harassment by establishing the following
elements: (1) the employer acted reasonably to prevent or correct the harassment; and (2) that the plaintiff failed to reasonably avoid harm by taking advantage of the employer's preventive or corrective opportunities or through other available
means. 65
Under the first prong of the reasonable-care defense, an
employer is required to take preventive action in accordance
with the employment situation. 66 An employer should inform
employees that the employer will not tolerate sexual harassment in its workplace. 67 Furthermore, the employer should
encourage employees to report harassment. 68 Additionally, employers should educate employees about harassment so that
employees know the difference between appropriate and inappropriate conduct.69 Formal anti-harassment policies are encouraged, but they are not required. 70 The larger the employer,
the more likely courts will find that the employer needs a formal grievance procedure. 71 Under the second prong of the defense, employees should use whatever means the employer has
made available to complain about sexual harassment.72 Under
certain circumstances, however, an employee's failure to use
the employer's grievance mechanism may be reasonable. 73 For
example, if the employer does not inform its employees about
its anti-harassment policy and complaint procedures, then the
employee's failure to use the complaint procedures would be
reasonable. 74

65 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
66 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
67 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0 (2004).
6B 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0 (2004).
69 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0 (2004).
70 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
71 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,808-9 (1998).
72 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
73 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,808-9 (1998).
74 See id.
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When internal procedures fail and the harassed employee
files suit against the employer, the factfinder must decide
whether actionable sexual harassment has occurred. 75 In Ellison u. Brady, the Ninth Circuit, recognizing that the reasonable person standard tended to be male-biased, held that the
factfinder should evaluate the severity and pervasiveness of a
"hostile work environment" from the perspective of the victim. 76
A contrary decision would allow the harasser to determine the
level of acceptable workplace conduct. 77 By adopting a reasonable-woman standard, the Ninth Circuit explained that it
would take into account the common concerns women share
about sexual behavior that men do not share. 7s At the same
time, this objective standard protects employers from "the idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive [sic] employee."79
The reasonable-woman standard arises in "hostile environment" cases and tangible employment action cases when plaintiffs allege that their supervisors made implicit threats to coerce the plaintiffs into sexual relationships.so

75 Elements of a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim include: "showing that a
supervisor explicitly or implicitly conditionledl a job, a job benefit, or a job detriment,
upon an employee's acceptance of sexual conduct." Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339
F.3d 1158, 1170 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). Elements of a "hostile work environment sexual harassment" claim include: 1) conduct of verbal or sexual
nature, 2) conduct "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998) (to be actionable sexual harassment must be
sex discrimination).
76 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
77 [d. at 878.
78 [d. at 879.
79 [d.
80 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (reasonable-woman standard used in hostile environment harassment cases); Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339
F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003) (reasonable-woman standard used in coerced submission cases).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss1/6

12

Jarratt: The Reasonable-Woman Standard

2004]

THE REASONABLE-WOMAN STANDARD

F.

HOLLY D. V. CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

1.

Factual and Procedural History

139

Holly D. presented a novel issue to the Ninth Circuit:
whether an employee who submits to a supervisor's implicit
quid pro quo threat has suffered a tangible employment action. 81 Holly D., was a single parent suffering from clinical depression and financial difficulties who worked for several years
at Caltech. 82 After approximately four years, Caltech promoted
Holly D. to Senior Division Assistant, working under Professor
Stephen Wiggins in Caltech's Control Dynamic Systems department. 83 Caltech policy required Holly D. to go through a
six-month probationary period. 84 During her probationary period, she alleged that Professor Wiggins eyed her chests and
buttocks, made inappropriate comments of a sexual nature,
and exposed her to pornographic websites. 85 Holly D. also alleged that Professor Wiggins complained about the quality of
her work and threatened to retain her on probationary status
indefinitely.86 Holly D. admitted that Professor Wiggins would
stop his sexually offensive conduct when she expressed uninterest. 87 After her probationary period ended, she received a
performance evaluation from Professor Wiggins that she considered negative. 88 Holly D. believed that Professor Wiggins
gave her a "negative" evaluation because she rebuked his sexual advances. 89 Holly D. decided that she would have to submit
to Professor Wiggins sexually in order to retain her job. 90
Holly D.'s and Professor Wiggins's first sexual encounter
occurred in July of 1997, shortly after her review. 91 Professor
Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id.at 1162.
83 Id.
84 Id.
55 Id. at 1163.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1163.
88 Id. at 1163 & n.2. The court reviewed the evaluation and noted that the overall evaluation was good but not one of the eight individually rated categories was rated
higher than satisfactory and half were rated unsatisfactory or fair. Id. 1163 n.2.
89 Id. at 1163.
90 Id. at 1163.
91 Id. at 1164.
81
82
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Wiggins came into Holly D.'s office and asked her what turned
her on. 92 She replied, "[w] hen people talk dirty.''93 Professor
Wiggins then asked her, "[w] ill you suck my dick?" She replied, "yes."94 After their last sexual encounter in July of 1998,
Holly D. spit semen onto her coat to preserve evidence of the
encounter.95
Holly D. knew that Professor Wiggins was sexually harassing her.96 She also knew that Caltech had a sexual harassment
policy.97 She did not report the harassment, however, because
she believed the university would favor a professor over a clerical employee. 98 After the sexual relationship stopped, Holly D.
applied unsuccessfully for several positions within the university.99 Believing that the other departments denied her transfers because she had previously taken disability leave for her
clinical depression, Holly D. filed a disability discrimination
claim with the EEOC.loo The EEOC investigated her complaint, but the EEOC found insufficient evidence to support her
disability charge. lol Shortly after the EEOC's determination,
Holly D. reported the sexual harassment to an ombudsman. 102
In 1999, Holly D. filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging
sexual harassment. 103 The EEOC sent Caltech a letter informing the university of Holly D.'s complaint.I04 Pursuant to CalId. at 1164.
Id. at 116494 Id.
95Id.
96 Id. at 1165, 1177.
97Id.
98 Id. at 1165.
99 Id. at 1164.
100 Id.
101Id.
102 Id.
An ombudsman is "[al n official appointed to receive, investigate, and
report on private citizens' complaints about the government [orl [al similar appointee
in a nongovernmental organization (such as a company or university)." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1115 (7th ed. 1999).
103 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). "At Holly
D.'s request, the EEOC issued her a right-to-sue notice without an investigation." Id.
at 1165. Right-to-sue notices are mandated by statute. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (West 2004)
(notice must be given to parties after investigation is completed). "A right-to-sue notice
is issued to the charging party after the EEOC concludes its investigation if any. The
charging party has 90 days after receipt of the right-to sue notice in which to file her
suit."
EEOC,
Charge
Processing
Procedures,
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview3harge_processing.html (last accessed on Mar.
13,2004).
104 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1165 (9th Cir. 2003).
92
93
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tech policy, Caltech assembled a neutral committee to investigate Holly D.'s sexual harassment allegations. lo5 The committee investigated Holly D.'s claim by interviewing Holly D., Professor Wiggins, and other employees. lOG Professor Wiggins denied that he and Holly D. had sexual relations. lo7 During the
initial investigation, Holly D. did not produce the specimen
that she had kept. lOB The committee found insufficient evidence
to support Holly D.'s claim.lo9 It recommended, however, that
Caltech transfer Holly D. to a female professor and review the
sexual harassment policy with Professor Wiggins.110
Originally, Holly D. brought her sexual harassment claims
under Title VII and the Fair Employment and Housing Act
against Wiggins and Caltech in California state court.1ll "Caltech removed the case to the [United States] District Court for
the Central District of California, and then moved for summary
judgment."112 The district court granted summary judgment
against Holly D.'s Title VII claims, holding that she had not
suffered a tangible employment action because she retained
her position, received raises, and she did not lose any employment benefits.113 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the Title VII claims, but adopted a different
legal standard to evaluate the tangible employment action issue. 114

105
106

1d. at 1165.
1d.

1071d.
1081d. at 1165 n.7. After Holly D. filed her suit, the semen stain on the coat was

tested. 1d. The semen was identified as Professor Wiggins's, and Caltech requested
that Wiggins resign from his position. [d.
109 1d. at 1165.
11°1d.

1d. Holly D. also alleged claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 and several state law tort causes of action. 1d. Holly D.'s Title VII claim against
Professor Wiggins is omitted for the remainder of this summation because Title VII
does not allow recovery by a plaintiff against a supervisor, even if the supervisor was
the harasser. 1d. at 1179.
112 1d. at 1165.
111

1131d.
114 1d. at 1167-69, 1179. The Ninth circuit reversed the lower court's grant of
summary judgment on Holly D.'s state law claims and remanded the state law claims
with instructions to remand the state law claims back to state court. 1d. at 1181.
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Ninth Circuit's Analysis

In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton holdings, the
Ninth Circuit dealt first with the issue of whether coerced
submission constituted a tangible employment actionYS Neither Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth nor Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton considered whether a tangible employment action occurs when an employee submits sexually to her supervisor to keep her job,us Successful coercion, achieved by threats
of termination and demotion, and unsuccessful coercion, resulting in the employee's termination or demotion, derive from the
same abuse of supervisorial power.1l7 In both situations, the
supervisor uses the "weight of the employer's enterprise in order to achieve the unlawful purpose. "118 Therefore, in the Ninth
Circuit, retaining an employee who submits to a quid-pro-quo
threat is a tangible employment action. 1l9 When a supervisor
successfully coerces sex from a subordinate by threatening a
tangible employment action, the supervisor has made participation in unwanted sexual acts a condition of employment. 12o
The agency relationship makes the supervisor's threat successful, and thus, the employer is liable to the harassment victim.l21
To make a prima facie case for successful coercion the
plaintiff must establish that the supervisor made an explicit or
implicit quid-pro-quo threat.122 Holly D. alleged that Professor
Wiggins implicitly conditioned her employment upon sexual
submission to him.123 To prove an implicit threat, the plaintiff
must show that a reasonable-woman in her position would
have believed that her supervisor was conditioning her employment on her willingness to submit to his sexual advances. 124
The Ninth Circuit noted that Holly D. failed to argue that a
[d. at 1166.
[d. at 1168.
117 [d. at 1168.
118 [d.
119 [d. at 1171 n.l8.
120 [d. at 1169.
121 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802-3, 805 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 763 (1998) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986»; Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2003).
122 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003).
123 [d.
124 [d. at 1173-74.
115

116
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different standard of reasonableness should apply in light of
her financial and psychological difficulties. 125
Implicit threats require cautious consideration in order to
protect the innocent party, whether that party is the defendant
or the plaintiff. 12G Creating sterile or barren workplaces is not a
Title VII objective. 127 Anti-sexual harassment law under Title
VII should protect consensual romances in the work place. 128
Weighing the evidence that Holly D. presented, the Ninth Circuit held that a reasonable woman in her position would not
have believed that Professor Wiggins implicitly threatened to
fire her if she rejected his sexual advances. 129 Although Professor Wiggins created a sexually charged environment, Holly D.
knew that he would stop this behavior if she asked him to.130
Furthermore, Holly D. did not produce any evidence that Professor Wiggins ever made a connection between the sexual and
the employment relationships.131 On the day of their first sexual encounter, Holly D. and Professor Wiggins did not discuss
work. 132 Their conversation was purely sexual. 133
After holding that Professor Wiggins did not coerce Holly
D. into a sexual relationship, the Ninth Circuit considered
Holly D.'s claim under a "hostile work environment" theory.134
The Ninth Circuit assumed that Holly D. presented sufficient
evidence at the district court level to make a prima facie case
for "hostile work environment sexual harassment" against Caltech. 135 Next, the Ninth Circuit considered whether Caltech
met the elements of the reasonable-care defense. 13G Holly D.
125

126
127
126
129
130

131

[d. 1174 n.19.
[d. 1174.
[d.

See id. at 1174.
[d. at 1175.
[d.
[d. The court notes that she provided three instances in deposition testimony

of his conduct that she believed proved he was threatening her; however, all three
occurred a significant amount of time outside of the time period in which the sexual
relationship took place. [d. at 1164 n.3.
132 [d. at 1175.
133 [d.
134 [d. at 1176. The Court discusses the fact that "hostile environment harassment" might not be the best phrase for sexual harassment that does not involve a tangible employment action; however, it uses this term for lack of a better one. [d. at 1167
n.13.
135 [d. at 1176.
136 [d. at 1177-79.
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used affidavits from an expert to argue that Caltech acted unreasonably in designing its sexual harassment policy.137 The
Ninth Circuit rejected her argument because the reasonablecare defense is not a question of what the employer should
have done to improve its anti-harassment policy.138 Instead, an
employer discharges its duty under the reasonable-care defense
if its actions were reasonably calculated to prevent and correct
sexual harassment. 139 Caltech acted reasonably by immediately
investigating Holly D.'s claim after Caltech received notice of
her complaint.140 Furthermore, Holly D.'s complete failure to
use Caltech's reporting procedures was unreasonable. 141 Caltech qualified for the reasonable-care defense. 142 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and remanded the
state law claims. 143
II.

CRITIQUE OF THE REASONABLE WOMAN SUFFERING FROM
EMOTIONAL OR FINANCIAL DISABILITIES STANDARDS

In Holly D., the Ninth Circuit suggested that a plaintiffs
subjective emotional or financial disabilities might have legal
significance in sexual harassment litigation brought under Title VII. 144 Adopting this suggestion would create customized
standards of reasonableness, and would adversely affect both
employers and employees. 145 Such a change would detrimen137 [d. at 1177. The expert's affidavit claimed that there were six different things
that Caltech could have done differently to make its anti-harassment policy reasonable,
the court mentions two ofthem:
Mandatory trainings and peer review of supervisors. [d. at 1177.
138 [d. at 1177.
139 [d.
140 [d. at 1177-78.
141 [d. at 1179.
142 [d. at 1177-79.
143 [d. at 118l.
144 [d. at 1174 n.19 (noting that the Ninth Circuit may consider the effects of a
plaintiffs emotional and financial disabilities if raised in a future case).
145 Customized standards of reasonableness are virtually subjective standards for
plaintiffs who have emotional or financial disabilities. Although the Ninth Circuit
phrased its suggested new standards in objective terms, the truth is that the more the
reasonable-woman standard resembles the actual plaintiff, the less objective it becomes. Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003) (reasonable-woman suffering with emotional or financial disabilities); cf. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET
AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 55-56 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the use of the characteristics of the reasonable person standard in relation to the tort of negligence). "Customized" "subjective" or "tailored" as used to modify standard or reasonable-woman stan-
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tally affect an employer's liability for supervisor harassment of
a subordinate, and an employer's ability to use the reasonablecare defense. 146
Customized reasonable-woman standards
would harm employees by creating inconsistent results in Title
VII cases and by forcing romance out of the workplace. 147
Customizing the reasonable-woman standard for plaintiffs
who suffer from emotional and financial disabilities would be
problematic for three reasons. First, these customized standards increase the scope of employer liability for supervisor
sexual harassment of a subordinate by allowing the plaintiffs
disabilities to control when a supervisor has misused the employer's authority and by allowing the plaintiffs disability to
excuse the plaintiff from reporting harassment. 148 Second, applying multiple standards to this decision would lead to discriminatory treatment of women under the law. 149 Women with
factually similar cases would find themselves with contradictory holdings. 15o Finally, customized standards would stifle romance in the workplace. 151 Employers and supervisors would
have greater reason to fear sanctions under these more subjective standards that would discourage social relationships between consenting employees. 152
A.

WIDENING THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY BY
DECLARING THAT WHICH IS UNREASONABLE, REASONABLE

Customized standards of reasonableness would increase
the scope of employer liability in two distinct ways. First,
these standards would increase the occurrence of "tangible employment action sexual harassment" where the plaintiff alleges
that the supervisor made an implicit quid-pro-quo threat. The
existence of a threat would depend on the plaintiff's disability
and not the supervisor's use of authority to extort sex. Hence,
the Ninth Circuit would broaden employer liability beyond the
dard refer to the reasonable-woman suffering with emotional or financial disabilities
standard.
146 See infra notes 153-176 and accompanying text.
147 See infra notes 177-201 and accompanying text.
148 See infra notes 153-168 and accompanying text.
149 See infra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
150 See infra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
151 See infra notes 184-201 and accompanying text.
152 See infra notes 184-201 and accompanying text.
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principles of agency law. Second, customized standards would
interfere with employers' successful use of the reasonable-care
defense by treating employees who fail to use their employers'
grievance procedures as reasonable. The Ninth Circuit can
avoid these undesirable results by maintaining the reasonablewoman standard.
In cases alleging that the supervisor used an implicit
threat to coerce the plaintiff into sexual relations, the factfinder should carefully consider the facts and look for a nexus
between the supervisor's allegedly threatening behavior, and
the supervisor's request for sexual relations. 153 If there is a
nexus between the threatening behavior and the sexual advances, then the factfinder should hold the employer liable for
"tangible employment action sexual harassment. "154 If the factfinder finds that the supervisor did not use implicit threats to
coerce the plaintiff into performing sexual acts with the supervisor, then the factfinder should find that that the employer is
not liable for "tangible employment action sexual harassment. "155 Maintaining focus on the interactions between the
supervisor and the plaintiff prevents falsely holding employers
liable for "tangible employment action sexual harassment. "156
Under customized standards, the plaintiff would divert the
factfinder's attention from the supervisor's conduct, redirecting
that attention to the plaintiffs disability. This diversion would
occur because the plaintiff would need to convince the jury that
she suffered from a disability and that this disability affected
her perception of the supervisor's conduct. 157 Focusing on the
plaintiffs disabilities is problematic because depression and
153 Holly D. v. Cal. lost. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003) "Har·
assment in cases of implicit conditioning can be inferred only from the particular facts
and circumstances of the case. We must examine each such charge with the utmost
care, for an error either way can result in a gross injustice and will often have a disas·
trous impact on the life of whichever person is truly the injured party)." [d. at 1174.
154 [d. at 1169, 1173.
155 See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that Holly D. failed to establish that Wiggins coerced her into a sexual relationship).
156 See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 1994».
157 Since the Ninth Circuit did not consider the effects of Holly D.'s disabilities on
her perception of Wiggins's conduct because she did not present evidence showing that
a different standard should apply to her, a future plaintiff who wishes to use this standard would need to provide the factfinder with evidence to establish the effects of these
disabilities on the plaintiffs perception. Holly D. v. Cal. lost. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158,
1174 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003).
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economic difficulties can distort perception. ISS Customized
standards would create situations where the jury might find an
implicit threat that is the product of a plaintiffs psychological
distress. 159 Agency principles do not justify this result. Employers are liable for supervisor harassment because they empower their supervisors with job-affecting authority. ISO Courts
should not impose liability on employers when the cause of the
problem is the plaintiffs psychological difficulties.
Consider, for example, Holly D.'s allegation that Professor
Wiggins gave her an unsatisfactory review about three weeks
before coming to her office and asking her "what turned her
on."lSl Had Holly D. raised the issue of the effect of her depression and financial troubles to the court, she would likely have
left the court victorious. 1s2 Her victory, however, would have
158

Briefs

See Ronald Pitzer, Negative Thinking and Depression, Stress Management
from the University of Minnesota (1985, copyright 2004), at

http://www.extension.umn.eduldistributionlfamilydevelopmenticomponentsJ726
9ca.htmI. (negative thinking thought to cause depression. Also, depressed individuals
"may base an overall conclusion on a single event);" see also Melissa Dittmann, The
Social Class Factor Psychologists conveyed poverty's mental health effects on the disadvantaged and chronically ill, Monitor on Psychology, Vol. 34, No.9, Oct. 2003, at 36
(available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/oct03/socialclass.html)(last accessed on Mar.
13,2004)
(poverty is connected to depression, feeling of low self-esteem, and helplessness). In
regards to economic disabilities, a future plaintiff might argue that her extreme financial needs colored her understanding of her supervisor's conduct. Cf Holly D. v. Cal.
Inst. of Tech., 339 F3d. 1158, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (focusing on the supervisor's threat
in a coercion case instead of the subordinate's "capacity to resist his advances" because
the Ninth Circuit recognized that some employees may desperately need the income to
make a house payment or the health benefits for a sick child); see also Jin v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 99 (2nd Cir. 2002). It is difficult to predict the intentions of
another person. An employee who cannot afford to lose her position would arguably be
more likely submit and arguably more likely to see a threat in the first instance. Her
economic position does not leave her room to gamble on the chance that her supervisor
is a decent person who would not use his position with the company to coerce sex from
other employees.
159 See supra note 158.
160 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799-802 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 757, 759-760 (1998) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986»; Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2003).
161 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2003).
162 The fact that the Ninth Circuit noted that it would consider this issue ifit was
appropriately raised in a future case implies that if Holly D. had established that depression and financial difficulties affected her view of Wiggins's behavior that the
Ninth Circuit would have taken her disabilities into account. See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst.
of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d
503, 512 (9th Cir. 1994) (listing other traits that the Ninth Circuit might incorporate
into the reasonable woman standard, such as "race, age, physical or mental disability,
and sexual orientation"); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995)
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been at the expense of justice because her victory would have
been due to her personal difficulties and not because Professor
Wiggins abused his supervisory power to coerce her into having
sex with him.163 If the Ninth Circuit adopts customized standards of reasonableness, it would in effect begin to hold employers liable for hiring individuals with emotional or financial
difficulties.
Conditioning employer liability on the plaintiffs distorted
perception of the supervisor's conduct does not further workplace equality. While the idea of an emotionally or financially
depressed individual submitting sexually to her supervisor in
order to "save" her job is distressing, the fact remains that Title
VII is concerned with eliminating gender discrimination. 164
Furthermore, compensating a plaintiff for an injury that she
suffered because of her emotional or financial depression does
not resolve the plaintiffs real problem. Title VII litigation
should result in verdicts that breakdown barriers for women in
the workplace, not verdicts that attempt to sooth the ailing
psyches of the plaintiffs. 165
In addition to increasing the number of coerced submission
cases, customized standards would also interfere with employers' abilities to successfully invoke the reasonable-care defense
in "hostile work environment sexual harassment" cases. Employees have a duty to avoid unnecessary harm; reporting the

("hostile work environment" must be determined from the perspective of a reasonable
person with the same fundamental characteristics)." Holly Do's disabilities could have
affected her perception thus making it reasonable for her to construe Wiggins' words
and actions as an implicit threat if she did not engage in sex with him. See infra note
157.
163 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003) (Holly D.
alleged that Professor Wiggins's conduct constituted an implicit threat).
164 The U.S. Supreme Court has made it very clear that sexual conduct violates
Title VII only if the alleged harasser treated the plaintiff differently because of the
plaintiffs sex. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
(citing Ginsburg's concurrence in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,25 (1993).
165 It would be a very different situation if the plaintiff sought to prove that her
supervisor used her disability to his advantage in order to obtain sexual favors. See
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, (9th Cir. 1994). If a plaintiff can show actual knowledge
of her disabilities and actual intent on the part of the supervisor to use those disabilities to harass her, then I believe that the effect of these disabilities would be important
to determining the existence of an implicit threat. [d. However, in Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology, the Ninth Circuit did not suggest that it would require the
plaintiff to show that the supervisor had actual knowledge of the plaintiffs disabilities.
See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 359 F3d 1158, 1173-74 & n.19 (9th Cir. 2003).
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harassment to the employer usually discharges this duty.166
Under customized standards, however, there would be a very
strong possibility that courts might excuse emotionally or financially depressed employees from reporting harassment to
their employers. Low self-esteem and feelings of helplessness
are symptoms of these conditions. 167 An employee who feels
helpless is likely to believe, just as Holly D. did, that reporting
the harassment would be useless. 16s Thus, it would be reasonable for an emotionally or financially depressed woman to
forego reporting harassment to her employer. Unfortunately,
short of video surveillance many large employers might not be
able to adequately police their workplaces for harassment
without the help of their employees. The courts should not encourage employees to avoid reporting sexual harassment by
calling this omission "reasonable" for employees who suffer
from emotional or financial disabilities.
By maintaining the status quo and rejecting customized
standards, the Ninth Circuit can ensure that employer liability
extends from the principles of agency law and not judicial sympathy for the terrible effects of psychological disabilities. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit can protect the important Title VII
policies that the reasonable-care defense furthers.169 The reasonable-woman standard is the appropriate standard to apply
because it balances the interests of all parties concerned. 170
166 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775, 807-808 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
167 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC., DEPRESSION, 21 (2002); see Melissa Dittmann, supra note 158.
168 See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Holly D. did not report the harassment because she thought that it would be useless.)
169 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-6 (1998) (discussing policies
behind Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
170 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (the reasonable-care
defense rewards employers who meet their duty to attempt to rid their workplaces of
sexual harassment and it holds employees reasonable for avoiding unnecessary injury).
For a deeper appreciation of the arguments for and against the use of gender specific
standards see Paul P. Dumont, Comment, Radtke v. Everett: An Analysis of the Michigan Supreme Court's Rejection of the Reasonable Woman/Victim Standard: Treating
Perspectives That Are Different as Though They Were Exactly Alike, 27 GoLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 255 (1997) (using feminist theory to support the reasonable woman standard); but see Saba Ashraf, The Reasonableness of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard:
An Evaluation of Its Use in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 483 (1992) (asserting that the
reasonable person standard is the appropriate standard for evaluating "hostile work
environment harassment)."
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The reasonable-woman standard stops the supervisor and the
employer from discriminating against women by denying them
the right to set the standard of appropriate workplace conduct. l7l The reasonable-woman standard also takes the concerns of women into consideration in defIning actionable sexual
harassment. 172 Furthermore, this standard protects employers
from liability by checking the plaintiff's notions of unacceptable
workplace conduct against that of a reasonable female. 173 Congress did not intend Title VII to prevent all offensive behavior.
174 What Title VII does restrict is the use of immutable characteristics to bar certain individuals with these characteristics
from an equal opportunity to enter the workforce and succeed
at their jobs. 175 Through the reasonable-woman standard,
courts can ensure that they do not turn Title VII into a civility
statute. 176

B.

UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF WOMEN UNDER THE LAw

The second problem customized standards would create is
inconsistent verdicts for the same or similar conduct. Title VII
seeks to end discriminatory employment decisions made on the
basis of an individual's membership in a particular group.177
Interpreting the statute should not result in legal standards
that create a preference for one group over another.178 Furthermore, courts should not create favored sub-groups within a
protected groUp.179 Doing so furthers discrimination, instead of
ending it. Customizing the reasonable-woman standard for
emotionally and fInancially disabled women would discrimi171

Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).

Id. at 879
173Id. at 879.

172

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
See id.
176 Id.at 81(Title VII does not protect individuals from every insult or injury that
they might suffer in the workplace).
177 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, (1971). (Racial discrimination
case). "Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and
only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by Congress is the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate based on racial or other impermissible classification."
174

175

Id.
178 See Id.

Women would be the main protected group and emotionally or financially
disabled women would be sub-groups within this protected group.
179
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nate against women who would not qualify for one of these
standards. Two women with identical complaints might find
themselves with disparate responses from the courts if only one
of these women could take advantage of the customized standards proposed by the Ninth Circuit.
To illustrate this point, consider the following scenarios.
In scenario one, supervisor Sam is attracted to employee Eve.
Sam flirts with Eve. Believing that she reciprocates his attraction, he asks her out on a date. Eve rejects Sam's invitation,
explaining that she does not think it would be a good idea to
date her boss. Sam ignores her rejection, telling Eve that they
could keep the date a secret. Eve persists in her rejection so
Sam nods and walks away. Three weeks later, Sam calls Eve
into his office and counsels her about some errors she made on
the last report she submitted. Eve has been having trouble in
her personal life. She recently divorced, and her teenage son is
not adjusting well. She does not tell Sam about her home troubles because she does not want to seem as if she is making excuses.
Sam tells Eve that she is an excellent worker and that he
would not be so concerned about her recent errors if it were not
for the fact that the company is talking about eliminating jobs.
He suggests that she be extra careful to avoid errors in the future. Then, if the company decides to eliminate some of its
workforce, she would not be one of the workers laid off. Eve is
distraught over this meeting, unsure whether the supervisor is
trying to help her keep her job, or make her fear that she is
losing it. A week after this meeting, Sam and Eve are at a retirement party hosted by their company for one of its vicepresidents. Champagne flows, and Sam strikes up a conversation with Eve. Their conversation begins with pleasantries and
then moves into the office. Eve asks Sam whether the rumors
about layoffs starting in the next couple of weeks are true. He
tells her that he cannot answer her question. Sam knows that
lay-offs will happen in a couple of weeks, but the company instructed supervisors to keep that knowledge to themselves until the company officially announces its decision.
They talk more as the night progresses; eventually, Sam
asks Eve to dance. At the end of the evening, Sam offers Eve a
ride home. She agrees so that she will not have to wait for a
taxi. Parked in front of Eve's home, Sam kisses her. Eve does
not push Sam way so he asks if he might come in for a nightPublished by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
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cap. Eve considers Sam's request for a few moments, more
than a little concerned that rejecting him again might cost her
job. She believes the rumors about lay-offs are true, and feels
that Sam's evasive response earlier that evening confirms her
belief. She does not want to lose her job so she invites him inside. Later that night, Sam and Eve have sex.
A couple of weeks pass, the company orders its supervisors
to pick employees for the first round of lay-offs. Sam picks
three employees, but retains Eve. Believing that Sam kept her
because she slept with him, Eve continues the sexual relationship. Eventually, she feels as though she can no longer continue in her relationship with Sam, but she is afraid to end it
because the company is still laying people off.
She talks to a friend about her problem. This friend suggests that she contact an attorney. Taking her friend's advice,
Eve contacts a lawyer who tells her that her employer could be
liable for sexual harassment if a jury finds that her supervisor
unlawfully coerced her into sexual relations. She decides to file
a complaint with the EEOC, requesting a right-to-sue notice
without an investigation. Subsequently, she files her suit in
the appropriate district court within the Ninth Circuit. Eve is
financially and emotionally stable. Therefore, she would be
subject to the reasonable-woman standard. The employer
moves for summary judgment, arguing that a reasonablewoman would not have believed that her supervisor was conditioning her continued employment on her willingness to submit
to him sexually. The court carefully considers the facts of the
case and holds that there is an insufficient nexus between
Sam's sexual advances and his employment decisions to find
that the Sam abused his power in order to extort sex from Eve.
The district court grants summary judgment in favor of the
employer.
Scenario two consists of the same set of facts as scenario
one, except that it involves supervisor Steve and employee
Elaine. Elaine has not handled her recent divorce well.
Shortly after her divorce, she began seeing a psychiatrist who
diagnosed her with depression. Elaine presents affidavits to
the court from an expert who swears to testify that Elaine's
depression made it reasonable for Elaine to believe that Steve
implicitly threatened Elaine with termination if she did not
have sex with Steve. The district court excludes the expert's
testimony because the Ninth Circuit uses a reasonable-woman
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss1/6
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standard to determine the existence of an implicit threat. The
plaintiff appeals the lower court's decision.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considers the employee's disabilities in deciding whether it was reasonable for her to conclude that her supervisor was conditioning her continued employment on her willingness to engage in sexual relations with
him. The court reasons that depressed women have special
concerns that "normal" women do not share. Negative thinking
and depression are companions; an individual suffering with
depression could reasonably conclude that her supervisor counseled her about her errors to threaten her job, not to save it. ISO
The Ninth Circuit holds that the factfinder should view Eve's
Title VII claims from the perspective of a reasonable-woman
suffering with depression. The case is then remanded to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with its holding. At trial, the expert testifies that depressed woman would
view Steve's actions as threatening. lSI The trial judge determines that the expert's testimony is reliable and instructs the
jury to consider the evidence in light of the plaintiff's emotional
difficulties. The jury finds for the plaintiff, holding the defendant liable for Elaine's injuries to the tune of $500,000.
The conclusions of these two cases would result in Elaine
receiving compensation for the ''wrong" she suffered, while Eve
is left to forge on, believing that she has been wronged not only
by her supervisor and her employer, but also by the justice system. These conflicting results would defy justification under
Title VII. Discriminatory treatment by the courts does not further Congress's efforts to eliminate discriminatory employment
decisions. ls2 Equal treatment in the workplace should result in
equal treatment under the law. While emotionally or financially depressed individuals have special concerns that not all
women share, individuals with these concerns should not receive preferential treatment under a statute concerned with

See Pitzer, supra note 158.
IS1Id.
IS2 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75,80 (1998) (Congress struck at all disparate treatment between the sexes); see also Meritor Say. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
180
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eliminating disparate employment decisions made because of
an individual's gender. ls3

C.

THE FRIGID WORKPLACE

Customized standards would unduly burden consensual
workplace romance by making the risk outweigh the benefit of
finding love at work. Under the reasonable-care defense, an
employer must show that it acted reasonably to prevent and
correct sexual harassment. ls4 One way that an employer can
meet this duty is by creating and enforcing a sexual harassment grievance procedure. ls5 In the Ninth Circuit, an employer
discharges this duty by demonstrating that it designed a plan
that it reasonably expected would prevent and correct sexual
harassment. ls6 Customized standards of reasonableness would
charge employers with the responsibility of devising separate
plans that would adequately protect employees who suffered
from one of the named disabilities, as well as for employees
who did not. Although it might seem easier for the employer to
resolve this issue by setting the standard of workplace conduct
by the higher threshold that customized standards would demand, this solution would not work because employers also
.face liability if they wrongfully sanction an employee for violating the anti-harassment policy.lS7 Thus, the law would burden
employers with devising plans that meet the needs of the emotionally and financially disabled as well as those of typical employees.
A problem that is inherent in fashioning anti-harassment
policies that incorporate definitions of harassment for emotionally and financially disabled employees is the fact that these
disabilities affect perception. ISS Therefore, both problems would

183 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
(stressing the fact that sexual harassment violates Title VII when it is discrimination
because of the victim's sex).
184 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,806-7 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
185 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,808-9 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
185 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158,1177 (9th Cir. 2003).
187 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0 (2004) (employers should properly sanction employees who sexually harass other employees).
185 See supra note 158.
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require advanced knowledge of social psychology.189 In essence,
employers would be asking their supervisors first to diagnosis
their subordinates and then act accordingly. This expectation
would be unreasonable, as most supervisors are not going to
have the training needed to determine if employees suffer with
one of these conditions. Even if a supervisor does assume that
an employee has one of these problems, it is unreasonable to
expect the supervisor to understand how the individual's condition might affect her perception of the supervisor's conduct. In
light of the issues raised by customized standards, employers
would need to find alternatives to reduce their risk ofliability.
One alternative that employers would likely find attractive
is an anti-fraternization policy.190 Anti-fraternization policies
exist in different forms: some employers place an outright prohibition on supervisor-subordinate dating, while others require
that dating co-workers sign love contracts. 19l
Antifraternization policies may effectively prevent sexual harassment; however, these policies are undesirable because they
solve the problem by avoiding the real issue. 192 Under federal
law, sexual harassment is not merely a question of sexually
offensive behavior; it is an issue of treating someone differently
because of that person's gender. 193 Conduct of a sexual nature
must be severe and pervasive enough to change the conditions
of the victim's employment before the accused harasser can be

189 Social Psychology is "the psychological study of social behavior, esp[ecially] of
the reciprocal influence of the individual and the group with which the individual interacts." WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 1811 (Sol Steinmetz, et al. eds,. 2nd ed.
1999).
190 See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2120 (2003).
Ms. Schultz discussed the attraction employers have to anti-fraternization policies
under the current state of anti-harassment law. See id. I am proposing that customized reasonable-woman standards will increase the prevalence of anti-fraternization
policies in the workplace.
191 Id.at 2122-2123, 2126-2129 (describing a "love contract" as a letter sent to the
subordinate employee by the supervising employee explaining that the relationship is
voluntary and requiring her signature to show that she understands that the relationship has no bearing on her position with the employer).
192 Seth Howard Borden, Note, Love's Labor Law: Establishing a Uniform Interpretation of New York's "Legal Recreational Activities" Law to Allow Employers to Enforce No-dating Policies, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 353, 379 (1996). Mr. Borden argues in
favor of anti-harassment policies, explaining that forbidding relationships between
employees will reduce the number of quid pro quo cases as long as most employees
follow the rules. Id.
193 E.g. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75,80 (1998).
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found to have violated Title VII.194 Forbidding supervisorsubordinate dating makes it easier for an employer to avoid
liability. 195 Unfortunately, this supposed solution to the problem of sexual harassment would not eliminate work-related
decisions made on the basis of gender. Banning dating merely
makes the opposite sex forbidden fruit. Anti-fraternization
policies fail to address the real problem with sexual harassment: using sex to belittle a person or to make an individual
feel incompetent at her job is discrimination because of that
person's sex. 196 Furthermore, anti-fraternization policies that
prohibit dating contradict the Ninth Circuit's charge that sexual harassment should not result in sterile workplaces. 197
Even if the employer does not implement an antifraternization policy, supervisors are likely to self-impose
workplace abstinence, as the risk of violating the antiharassment policy would increase under customized standards. 19s The Ninth Circuit recognizes that employees of different ranks within an organization can fall in love. 199 If protecting consensual relationships is important to the Ninth Circuit,
as stated in Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology, then
the court will not implement customized standards. 20o Moreover, by rejecting customized standards, the Ninth Circuit
would help to ensure that employers do not unjustly sanction
supervisors for behavior that Title VII does not prohibit. While
finding love at work may not be of interest to all employees, the
courts and employers should not use federal anti-harassment
law as a blocking mechanism for employees who might meet
that special someone who just happens to be sitting three cubicles away.20l
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,67 (1986).
Borden, supra, note 192 at 379.
196 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
197 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (the Supreme
Court has also discouraged using Title VII to prevent workplace romance).
198 See supra notes 184-201 and accompanying text.
199 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted).
200 [d.
201 A poll of 1000 workers found that 47% engaged in workplace romances and
another 19% would be willing to engage in a workplace romance. Sue Shellenbarger,
Workplace romances encounter obstacles, Wall Street Journal, reprinted in Contra
Costa
Times,
Feb.
20,
2004,
available
at
194

195
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III. CONCLUSION
Instead of making changes to the reasonable-woman standard, the Ninth Circuit should focus on encouraging employers
to properly police their workplaces for sexual harassment. The
reasonable-care defense creates an incentive for employers to
make use of these internal justice systems to eliminate workplace harassment. 202 The Ninth Circuit's holding in Holly D. v.
California Institute of Technology should further reinforce employers' incentives to ensure that employees are encouraged to
report threats.203 By barring employers from using the reasonable-care defense in coercion cases, the Ninth Circuit reinforced
the importance of preventing sexual harassment. 204 Employers
who wish to avoid liability for coercion cases need to vigorously
promulgate their anti-harassment policies and procedures, and
make efforts to encourage employees to use these procedures
instead of submitting themselves sexually to supervisors.
Adopting customized reasonable-woman standards would undermine the positive effects of the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology.
The Ninth Circuit's suggestion that it might consider the
legal effects of a plaintiffs emotional and financial difficulties
in deciding implicit threat sexual harassment cases raises a
number of troubling issues. 205 Creating a more subjective standard leads to unjustifiable employer liability and unfairly denies employers the ability to use the reasonable-care defense.
Furthermore, custom-fit standards of reasonableness would
http://www.contracostatimes.comlmldlcctimeslbusinessl7998950.htm (last accessed on
Mar. 13, 2004).
202 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
203 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that coerced submission is a tangible employment action).
204 But see Maria Greco Danahar, Relationships Between Supervisors And Subordinates May Lead To Legal Liability, 5 No. 19 LAWYERS J.6 (2003). This article reviews the Ninth Circuit's decision in Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F3d. 1158 and
then warns employers that they must acknowledge that supervisor-subordinate dating
can lead to liability for sexual harassment. While this article does not directly encourage the use of anti-fraternization policies, it suggests that the Holly D. decision has
incited fear in the employers' bar. This fear may encourage employers to take drastic
measures, such as anti-fraternization policies, instead of more meaningful ones such as
encouraging employees to use the complaint procedures.
205 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that emotional and financial disabilities might be incorporated into the reasonable woman standard).
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result in unequal treatment of women in the workplace and
would quash workplace romance. To avoid the ramifications of
tailoring the reasonable-woman standard to fit individual
plaintiffs with certain disabilities, the Ninth Circuit should
maintain the objective reasonable-woman standard.
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